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Ethics and Disclosure: A Study of the Financial Performance of Firms in the 
Seasoned Equity Offerings Market 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
In this article, we examine the association between ethics and disclosure and the impact of this 
association on the long-term, post-issue performance of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We 
argue that firms with extensive disclosure are less likely to face information problems, and more 
likely to lead to active shareholder monitoring, and therefore, engage in fewer unethical activities, 
such as aggressive earnings manipulation, and have better long-term, post-issue performance. 
Consistent with these predictions, this study presents evidence that disclosure is negatively 
related to unethical earnings manipulation and positively associated with long-term, post-issue 
performance. In particular, we find that long-term, post-issue SEO underperformance is 
significantly less for firms with extensive disclosure and conservative earnings management than 
firms with less disclosure and aggressive earnings management.  We interpret this evidence to 
mean that over the long run, the capital market values ethical financial reporting and corporate 
efforts to incorporate social responsibility into their decision-making processes, for example, by 
enhancing information transparency through voluntary disclosure.   
 
 
JEL classification: G14; G24; G32; M14; M41 
 
Key Words: Ethics, Social responsibility, Disclosure, Earnings management, Seasoned equity 
offerings, Long-term, post-issue performance
One of the most significant corporate trends of the last decade is the growth of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR).1 More than half of the Fortune 1,000 companies regularly issue 
CSR reports and a large number of firms are engaged in a serious effort to define and integrate 
CSR into various aspects of their business.  Definition of CSR varies, however. Friedman (1970) 
first defines CSR as follows: “Corporate social responsibility is to conduct the business in 
accordance with shareholders’ desires, which generally will be to make as much money as 
possible while conforming to the basic rules of society, both those embodied in law and those 
embodied in ethical custom.”  McWilliams and Siegel (2001) define CSR as actions that appear 
to further some social good, beyond the firm’s interests and that which is required by law.  Hill et 
al (2007) define CSR as the economic, legal, moral, and philanthropic actions of firms that 
influence the quality of life of relevant stakeholders.  Barnea and Rubin (2005) suggest that 
while definitions of CSR vary, it generally refers to serving people, communities and 
environment in a way that goes beyond and above what is legally required of a firm.   
While CSR is closely related to ethical issues concerning corporate decision-making and 
behavior, recent accounting scandals by such renowned companies as AOL Time Warner, Enron, 
Merck, Qwest Communications, WorldCom, Xerox, Parmalat (the European version of Enron), 
Daewoo, and SK Global (Korean conglomerates) have raised serious concerns among market 
participants about ethical issues in a global world.  These companies have disregarded ethics and 
placed more emphasis on short-term gains to top management by manipulating their earnings. 2    
                                                           
1See, for example, Tsoutsoura (2004).  She suggest that an increasing number of shareholders, analysts, regulators, 
activists, labor union, employees, community organizations, and news media are asking companies to be 
accountable for an ever-changing set of CSR issues.  
 
2 Corporate social responsibility and business ethics are often regarded as the same concepts. However, the CSR 
movement is one aspect of the overall discipline of business ethics. The CSR movement arose particularly during 
the 1960s with increased public consciousness about the role of business in helping to cultivate and maintain highly 
ethical practices in society and particularly in the natural environment.   
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In this paper, we define unethical firms as firms that manipulate their earnings 
aggressively. 3   Similarly, we define ethical firms as firms choosing ethical reporting, i.e., 
conservative earnings management.  In addition, we define more frequent and persistent 
disclosures that make the firm’s information environment transparent as socially responsible (or 
transparency-increasing) disclosures, similar to the argument made by Gelb and Strawer (2001). 
We also define less frequent and non-persistent disclosures that make information environment 
opaque as socially irresponsible (or transparency-decreasing) disclosures. Based on these 
definitions, we first examine the endogenous relation between ethical behavior in financial 
reporting and disclosure.  We then examine whether the firms with ethical financial reporting 
and socially responsible disclosures perform better financially than unethical firms with less 
disclosure in terms of their long-term, post-issue performance in the U.S. seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs) market.   
We choose the SEO market because of the well-known evidence indicating that firms 
issuing equity inflate their stock price temporarily via earnings manipulation around SEOs and 
that market participants fail to adjust for earnings manipulation adequately, leading to post-
offering stock underperformance (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998; DuCharme, Malatesta, and 
Sefcik, 2004). Casual observation suggests that there is a wide variation in disclosure strategies. 
Some firms communicate continuously with investors through voluntary disclosure, while others 
provide very little information.   
                                                           
3 Schipper (1989) defines earnings management as “purposeful intervention in the external reporting process, with 
the intent of obtaining some private gain to managers or shareholders.” Healey and Wahlen (1999) define earnings 
management as follows: Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on the reported accounting numbers. 
We follow these definitions of earnings management throughout the paper. 
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Recently, Jo and Kim (2007) suggest that disclosure frequency is inversely related to 
earnings management and positively associated with one-year post-issue performance.  However, 
while both disclosure and earnings management decisions are endogenously determined, they 
address neither the endogenous natures of disclosure and earnings management nor the long-term 
consequence of these decisions. We explore the possible relation among ethics, disclosure, and 
the long-term consequences of socially responsible disclosure and ethical reporting practices by 
investigating long-term financial performance. 
We first hypothesize that aggressive earnings management is inversely associated with 
socially responsible disclosure, and vice versa. We also hypothesize that firms with aggressive 
earnings management and socially irresponsible disclosure tend to have inferior long-term return 
performance, to the extent that investors, in general, prefer stocks of ethical companies over 
those of unethical companies, and socially responsible firms over irresponsible firms, if other 
factors are held constant.  
Using the number of press releases by searching press-release wires in the Dow Jones 
Interactive (DJI) database system as a measure of disclosure, we find evidence that the 
disclosure of U.S. SEO firms is endogenously and inversely associated with our measure of 
earnings manipulation: performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals (ADTA), as suggested 
by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005). Additionally, the long-term, post-issue SEO performance 
of firms with high disclosure and conservative earnings management is significantly better than 
that of firms with low disclosure and aggressive earnings management over the five-year period 
after the offering.  Based on these results, we conclude that ethical perspectives and social 
responsibility make a significant impact on the equity offering market over the long run.    
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This paper contributes to the CSR and financial-performance literature in two ways.  
First, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first attempt to address the endogenous 
association between ethical reporting and socially responsible disclosure (as a part of CSR) 
around SEOs.  This study is important in light of recent financial scandals suggesting that many 
highly reputed U.S. firms disregard ethics and manipulate their earnings. Second, this paper 
addresses the relation between the combined effect of ethical reporting and socially responsible 
disclosure and its impact on long-term, post-offering SEO performance, and therefore it sheds 
additional light on the issue of whether the equity offering market, in general, values social 
responsibility through voluntary disclosure and ethical aspects by earnings management over the 
long term. 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance 
 The relation between social responsibility activities and financial performance has been 
an important topic of debate at least since 1960.  Oberman (2000) refers to academic debates 
over CSR even taking place in the 1920s.  These debates are still developing and represent some 
of the important potential role of CSR and its impact on valuation both dynamic and vital.  The 
literature we briefly review consists of three principal strands: 1) model predictions of CSR; 2) 
empirical relation between CSR and financial performance; and 3) link between socially 
responsible investing and CSR.  
 
Model predictions of CSR  
We first briefly review theory and model predictions of the relation between CSR and 
financial performance. The theoretical model predictions of CSR vary. Some CSR models 
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predict that CSR expenditures will increase stock price up to certain point.  Navarro (1988) 
assumes that CSR spending improves the quantity of sales, while Webb (1996) assumes that 
CSR spending improves price. Other model predicts that CSR expenditure will not affect stock 
price.  In the simple world where there are no frictions, Small and Zivin (2002) develop a 
Modigliani-Miller’s (1958) irrelevance result by showing that if the investor optimally wishes to 
donate, the two firms’ stock prices will be equal and they will be independent of the level of 
donation made. Van De Ven and Jurissen (2005) maintain that although the mainstream of 
current thinking in business ethics recognizes that a firm should invest in CSR, the normative 
theory of how specific, competitive conditions affect a firm's social responsibility remains 
underdeveloped. 
 
Empirical studies of CSR 
According to Margolis and Walsh (2003), over one hundred and twenty studies between 
1971 and 2001 have examined the empirical relation between CSR and financial performance, 
and the results are largely inconclusive. Wood and Jones (1995) and Margolis and Walsh (2003) 
suggest that assessments of previous studies are complicated because of the imperfect nature of 
many studies, such as measurement problems of both CSR and financial performance, omitted 
variable problems, lack of the necessary analysis of causality and/or endogeneity, lack of 
methodological rigor in many studies, and lack of theory.  Nonetheless these studies stress that 
bad social performance is detrimental to a firm’s financial performance. 
While it is abstruse to draw a definite conclusion due to the imperfect nature of many 
studies, most recent reviews of the empirical CSR literature conducted by Margolis and Walsh 
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(2003) and Orlitzky et al (2003) indicate a positive relation between investing in socially 
responsible activities and financial performance.   
 
Link between socially responsible investing and CSR  
The link between SRI and CSR has also received considerable research attention recently, 
particularly in terms of financial performance.4  The value of SRI in financial markets is also, at 
best, mixed and inconclusive. While some findings indicate that ethical aspects do not affect the 
financial performance of SRI (Hamilton, Jo, and Statman, 1993; Statman, 2000; Kreander, Gray, 
Power, and Sinclair, 2005), other studies suggest that creating and implementing ethical codes of 
conduct have significant implications for financial communities (Hellsten and Mallin, 2006).  
Barnet and Salomon (2006) suggest that various screening criteria of SRI result in different 
impacts on financial performance and show that while community-relations screening increases 
financial performance, environmental and labor relations screening decreases financial 
performance.   
 
Hypothesis: Ethics and Disclosure  
  While the most researchers focus on the relation between CSR and financial 
performance, some researchers have devoted considerable attention to firms’ policies regarding 
voluntary disclosure. For instance, previous studies (e.g, Botosan, 1997; Lang and Lundholm, 
2000) suggest that equity-issuing firms can increase their stock prices by reducing their cost of 
                                                           
4 There is an increasing trend toward a conscious awareness of ethical issues in the investment community.  
According to the Social Investment Forum’s fifth biennial report on socially responsible investment (SRI) trends 
(2006), SRI assets grew faster than the entire universe of managed assets in the United States over the last 10 years.  
Total socially responsible investment assets rose more than 258 percent from $639 billion in 1995 to $2.29 trillion in 
2005, while the broader universe of assets under professional management increased less than 249 percent from $7 
trillion to $24.4 trillion over the same period. 
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capital through voluntary disclosure.  On the other hand, Gelb and Strawer (2001) argue that firms 
disclose because it is socially responsible to do so. They maintain that companies have incentives 
to engage in stakeholder management by undertaking socially responsible activities and that 
providing extensive and informative disclosures is one such practice. Based on disclosure 
rankings provided by the annual Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) 
Reports, they suggest that there is a positive relation between disclosure level and CSR and 
conclude that increased disclosure is a form of socially responsible behavior.  Following Gelb 
and Strawer (2001), we use a persistent and frequent disclosure over an extended period as 
socially responsible, transparency-increasing disclosure. 
 
The endogenous nature of ethics and disclosure  
One possible linkage between ethical reporting and socially responsible disclosure is 
through information transparency. To examine the relation between ethical reporting and 
disclosure, we first consider their endogenous nature.  In general, we expect that better 
information environment through extensive disclosure enhance investor’s awareness of ethical 
aspects.  For instance, Schipper (1989) argues that the absence of full communication (or the 
existence of blocked communication) together with asymmetric information makes it possible 
for managers to engage in unethical behaviors, such as earnings manipulation. Consequently, we 
expect that corporate incentives for unethical decision making, such as earnings manipulation, 
will be high when information asymmetry regarding the firm’s economic earnings is high. 
Conversely, with less information asymmetry through persistent and frequent disclosures, 
managers will be less likely to manipulate earnings. While the previous discussion suggests that 
extensive disclosure reduces the incentive for earnings management, it is also possible that lower 
disclosure is induced by a desire to manipulate earnings.  Hence, we have: 
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Information Hypothesis: Unethical corporate behavior, such as aggressive earnings manipulation, 
is inversely associated with voluntary disclosure, while corporate-responsibility-enhancing 
decisions, such as transparency-increasing disclosure, are endogenously determined as a negative 
function of earnings management. 
 
Long-term, post-issue SEO performance 
 The relation between social responsibility activities and financial performance has been 
an important topic of debate at least since 1960.  Oberman (2000) refers to academic debates 
over CSR even taking place in the 1920s.  These debates are still developing and represent some 
of the important potential role of CSR and its impact on valuation both dynamic and vital. 
The literature of agency problems and corporate disclosure can provide an important 
insight into the relation between socially responsible disclosure and long-term financial 
performance.  In their seminal work on agency problems, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest 
that outside shareholder monitoring helps reduce the agency costs associated with the separation 
of ownership and control.  In a related vein, Merton (1987) states that: 
“…For example, a newspaper or other mass media story about the firm or its industry that 
reaches a large number of investors who are not currently shareholders, could induce some of 
this number to incur the set-up costs and follow the firm. Having done so, in our model, these 
investors would evaluate the detailed substantive information about the firm, become new 
shareholders, and value of the firm would rise. It should be stressed that the current shareholders 
may already know all the information contained in such stories. Nevertheless, if the form of the 
prior public releases of the information did not capture widespread attention among investors 
who do not follow the stock and if the new form does, the firm’s investor base will increase and 
the stock price will rise.” (pp. 500-501). 
 
From Merton (1987), we can infer that persistent and frequent disclosures can enhance 
investor cognizance or attention, thus enlarging the shareholder pool and increasing shareholder 
monitoring.  We argue that this increased monitoring, along with the reduction of information 
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asymmetry reduces the long-term, post-issue SEO underperformance. 5  In addition, the 
monitoring role of disclosure has both concurrent and lasting effects on a SEO’s post-issue 
performance. Because investors become new shareholders at various times, the pool of 
shareholders increases not only during the pre-offering period but also during the post-issue 
period.  As a result, outside shareholder monitoring has an almost continuous and lasting impact 
on post-issue performance. 6  Furthermore, maintaining a high level of disclosure over an 
extended period (even after the offering date) is important to holding investor attention.7  
Prior research shows that firms engaging in unethical reporting, such as income-
increasing earnings management around SEOs, suffer with lower stock price in the long-run. In 
particular, Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, b) and Rangan (1998) find that long-run, post-issue 
performance is negatively related to earnings management.  This relation between unethical 
reporting and long-run underperformance will be stronger when the effect of unethical reporting 
is combined with that of socially irresponsible disclosure.  
In short, disclosure plays an important role in reducing post-issue SEO underperformance 
because corporate self-monitoring and outside market monitoring help reduce agency costs 
                                                           
5 In a similar line of reasoning, Chung and Jo (1996) claim that security analysts’ monitoring of firm performance 
helps motivate managers, thus reducing the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control.  
They find that analyst following exerts a significant positive impact on a firm’s market value.  Recently, Hartzell 
and Starks (2003) suggest that institutional investors also serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency problem 
between shareholders and managers. 
 
6 There are direct and indirect effects of disclosure on post-issue performance. To see these points more clearly, note 
first that the relation among post-issue performance (P), disclosure (DL), and earnings management (EM) can be 
depicted by the functional form P = f{DL, EM(DL)}.  Notice that disclosure has both a direct and an indirect effect 
(through its impact on earnings management) on post-issue performance.  Next, note that the total derivative of P 
with respect to DL is dP/dDL = ∂P/∂DL + (∂P/∂EM)(dEM/dDL), where ∂P/∂DL is the direct effect of disclosure on 
post-issue performance and (∂P/∂EM)(dEM/dDL) is the indirect effect of disclosure through earnings management 
on post-issue performance.  According to our monitoring argument, we expect to have ∂P/∂DL > 0. In accordance 
with our information hypothesis, we expect to have dEM/dDL < 0 and according to Teoh, Welch, and Wong 
(1998a) and Rangan (1998), we expect ∂P/∂EM < 0.  As a result, the total (net) effect (i.e., dP/dDL) of disclosure on 
post-issue performance is positive. 
 
7 Regarding earnings management, Rangan (1998) and Jo and Kim (2007) suggest that firms manage earnings even 
after the offering due to their concerns over lawsuits and lock-up agreements with underwriters. 
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through increased investor attention. Together with previously reported evidence of long-run, 
post-issue underperformance of unethical firms, this implication lead us to the following 
hypothesis. 
 
Monitoring Hypothesis: (a) Socially responsible disclosure: Long-term, post-issue SEO 
performance is an increasing function of socially responsible, transparency-increasing disclosure 
because of its monitoring role that reduces agency problems; (b) Disclosure and ethical 
reporting: Long-term, post-issue SEO underperformance is largest for SEO firms that engage in 
unethical financial reporting and socially irresponsible disclosure. 
 
Data and Research Design 
Data description 
We obtain an initial sample of all U.S. common stock SEOs that occur between January 
1990 and December 1997 from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database. We also 
examine post-offering returns up to five years after the offerings (i.e., up to 2002).  We search 
for press releases (our proxy of disclosure activity) for our sample firms from the press-release 
wires in the Dow Jones Interactive (DJI) database system. We limit the sample to firms that are 
available on the COMPUSTAT and CRSP (Center for Research in Stock Price) databases. 
Offerings by financial institutions are excluded because the nature of these firms’ accruals differs 
from that of industrial firms. Our final sample consists of 1,431 offerings.  We obtain the 
ownership data (institutional ownership, block ownership, and insider ownership) from the 
Spectrum of Compact Disclosure. Actual samples used in the analyses are different, since the 
data availability varies for each regression analysis. We use the latest data available prior to the 
offering announcement.  
SEO announcement dates are obtained from the DJI database. We search for SEO 
announcements (including intention to file, approval by the company’s board, and stockholders’ 
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approval) within the two years preceding the SEO filing date reported in the SDC database. When 
we cannot find the SEO announcement before the SEO filing date, we treat the SEO filing date as 
the SEO announcement date.  
 
Research design 
Due to the endogenous nature of ethics and disclosure, we employ a three-stage least-
squares (3SLS) regression to estimate the simultaneous model as follows.  
 
DL = a + b1*ADTA + control variables,                                                                                      (1) 
  
ADTA = a + b1*DL + control variables,                                                                                                (2) 
  
where DL is our disclosure measure, an average percentile rank of the number of press 
releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(+3), following Jo and Kim (2007) (see the 
calculation of DL in Appendix A); ADTA is our earnings manipulation measure, the annualized 
performance-adjusted discretionary total accrual scaled by lagged total assets, following Kothari 
et al. (2005). In particular, we estimate earnings management with performance-adjusted 
discretionary total accruals, as suggested by Kothari et al. (2005). They show that existing 
methods for estimating discretionary accruals are biased toward rejecting the null hypothesis of 
no earnings management when the event related to the incentive is associated with performance. 
Kothari et al. (2005) recommend adjusting discretionary accruals by subtracting discretionary 
accruals of control firms matched on prior-year ROA and industry. Following Kothari et al. 
(2005), we match each SEO firm with a non-SEO firm from the same industry (using the two-
digit SIC code), with the closest ROA (net income divided by lagged total assets) in the year 
ending prior to Q(-1). ADTA is the discretionary accruals of the SEO firm minus the 
discretionary accruals of the performance matched, non-SEO firm, summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) 
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and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1).  Discretionary total accruals are estimated by the 
cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model using two-digit SIC codes.  Figure 1 shows our 
timing convention.   
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
 
Q(.) represents the quarters around a SEO.  The quarter of the last earnings announcement before 
the offering announcement is labeled Q(–1). Q(0) is the quarter of the first earnings 
announcement after the offering announcement.  All other quarters are similarly indexed relative 
to the offering announcement.  M(.) is the six-month period in which disclosure frequencies are 
determined.  M(-1) is the last six-month period prior to the SEO announcement, and M(0) is the 
first six-month period after the SEO announcement.  All other six-month periods are similarly 
indexed relative to the offering announcements. 
 
Control variables and the structural model  
 
Considering potential endogeneity, we employ a structural model for an empirical 
representation of the relation between disclosure (DL) and earnings management proxied by 
performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals (ADTA). To reduce the possibility of model 
misspecification due to missing variables, we control for additional variables in the model.  King, 
Pownall, and Waymire (1990), Lang and Lundholm (1993), and Skinner (1994) find that 
disclosure activities are positively associated with firm size and return volatility, and negatively 
associated with performance, change of performance, and return-earnings correlation. Thus, we 
include these as explanatory variables for the disclosure regressions. Disclosure might vary with 
the economic and market environment, corporate governance, and the firm’s ownership structure, 
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as well as the availability of other sources of firm information. To capture these effects on 
disclosure, we use control variables, including institutional ownership, blockholder ownership, 
insider ownership, and the number of analysts following the firm.  
Numerous studies have documented that earnings management is negatively associated 
with operating cash flow, change in performance, auditor quality, and the absolute value of total 
accruals (Dechow, 1994; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and 
Subramanyam, 1998). We thus include operating cash flow, change in return on assets (ROA), 
auditor quality, and the absolute value of total accruals as explanatory variables. In addition, we 
include firm size, leverage, and ownership variables as additional control variables in our 
earnings management regressions. 
 Since an application of ordinary least squares (OLS) to a simultaneous equations model 
can yield biased and inconsistent parameter estimates, we employ a three-stage least-squares 
(3SLS) regression to estimate the simultaneous model as follows. (The expected signs are noted 
above each coefficient.)  
                                 -                            -                                 -                                          - 
 DL = a + b1*ADTA + b2*ROA + b3*CROA + b4*AR_bf6m  
                              +                 -            +                       +    
          + b5*SIZE + b6*RE + b7*STD10YR + b8 *INSTI  
     +                       +                        + 
             + b9 *BLOCK + b10 *INSIDER + b11 *NUM_ANST + e,                                           (3) 
 
 
                       -               -                -                    + 
 ADTA = a + b1*DL + b2*OCF + b3*CROA + b4*SIZE  
                +                -                  -                     -                      +         
            + b5*LEV + b6*INSTI + b7*BLOCK + b8*INSIDER + b9*NONB6 
                - 
            + b10*ABSTACC + e                                                                                                       (4) 
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where DL is an average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month 
period over M(-4) through M(+3); ADTA is the annualized performance-adjusted discretionary 
total accrual over the period Q(–1) through Q(+2) scaled by lagged total assets; ROA is an 
annualized return on assets (ROA) measured as income before extraordinary items summed over 
Q(–1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1); CROA is the changes in 
annualized ROA measured as income before extraordinary items summed over Q(+3) to Q(+6) 
and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(+3) minus income before extraordinary items summed 
over Q(–1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1); AR_bf6m is the market-
adjusted returns over the one-year period ending 6 months before the offering announcement. 
Market-adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the return on the value-weighted market 
index from firm returns; SIZE is the log of the market value of equity at Q(-1); RE is an annual 
return/earnings correlation measured over 10-year period before the offering announcement; 
STD10YR is the standard deviation of market-adjusted returns over the 10 years prior to the 
offering announcement; INSTI is the percentage ownership of institutional investors; BLOCK is 
the percentage ownership of blockholders; INSIDER is the percentage ownership of insiders; 
NUM_ANST is  the number of analysts’ following the firm; OCF is the operating cash flow over 
the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) scaled by the lagged total assets; LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio, 
the proxy for the closeness to the violation of lending contracts; NONB6 is an indicator variable, 
which is set equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is not one of big six accounting firms, and 0 
otherwise; and ABSTACC is the absolute value of total accruals over the period Q(-1) through 
Q(+2) scaled by the lagged total assets.  
 
Measurement of long-term SEO performance 
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To examine the long-term SEO performance for up to five years after a SEO, we follow 
the Fama & French (1993) three-factor model approach and run the following regression for 
individual securities in each group classified based on disclosure and earnings management.  
(Rit – Rft) = α + b1 (Rmt – Rft) + b2 SMBt + b3 HMLt + eit                                                         (5) 
where Rit is the monthly return of SEO firm i. Rmt – Rft is the market excess return in month t. 
SMBt is the difference between the month t return on a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks 
and one of large stocks. HMLt is the difference between month t return on a value weighted 
portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks, and eit is the error 
term.   
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table I reports the sample statistics and data characteristics for the 1,431 offerings.  
 
[Insert Table I about here.] 
 
Panel A of Table I shows that seasoned equity issues are not clustered by time periods, except 
that 1990 carries only 5.8% of the issues. Panels B and C provide summary information on issuer 
size and offering characteristics. The mean and median of book value of assets are $988 million 
and $146 million, respectively. The mean and median of the equity market capitalization are 
$780 million and $200 million, respectively. Issuer size varies considerably as indicated by the 
large standard deviation. The mean and median offering proceeds are $81 million and $43 
million respectively.  The mean increase in shares due to the offering is 26%.   
 
Empirical Results 
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Bivariate relations 
 Before we proceed to the multivariate analysis, it is informative to examine whether the 
bivariate relations between disclosure and earnings management are consistent with our 
hypotheses.  The bivariate correlation coefficients are reported in Table II.  
 
[Insert Table II about here.] 
 
Table II presents the pearson correlation coefficients among the variables used in the regression 
analyses. The bivariate correlation coefficient between disclosure and earnings management 
variable is significantly negative.8   
Figure 2 illustrates the bivariate relations among disclosure, earnings management, and 
post-issue performance.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here.] 
 
The figure shows the post-issue performance (i.e., market-adjusted returns compounded daily 
over the one-year period after the Q(+2) earnings announcement) for different levels of disclosure 
when earnings management varies. After controlling for earnings management, post-issue 
performance and disclosure are positively correlated, supporting our monitoring hypothesis (a). In 
addition, as expected, the greater the disclosure, the lower the earnings management measured by 
the ADTA at all levels of the post-issue performance, supporting the information hypothesis. 
Overall, this suggests that our bivariate results are consistent with both of our hypotheses.  
 
 The simultaneous association between disclosure and earnings management 
                                                           
8 Our unreported results suggest that the negative relation between disclosure and the earnings management variable 
does not change with measurements across various time spans or other proxies of earnings management. 
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 To incorporate the endogenous characteristics of disclosure and earnings management, 
we present the results of the 3SLS regressions in Table III.  
 
[Insert Table III about here.] 
 
The 3SLS regression results show that the included variables jointly account for nearly 26% of 
the variation in disclosure and earnings management. As hypothesized, there is a significant and 
negative, bidirectional relation between disclosure and earnings management. The results show 
that the ADTA yields a significant, negative impact on the DL. Likewise, the DL also exerts a 
significant, negative influence on the ADTA. Specifically, the estimated regression coefficient 
suggests that a 1% increase in the ADTA results in a 0.3715-0.3718% decrease in the DL.  
Similarly, we find that a 1% increase in the DL results in a 0.6543-0.8296% decrease in the 
ADTA. The combined results provide empirical support for our information hypothesis that 
disclosure is a decreasing function of earnings management and earnings management is a 
decreasing function of disclosure. The former evidence is consistent with the single-equation 
OLS evidence of Jo and Kim (2007). Our unreported results suggest that the results remain 
qualitatively unchanged using other proxies of earnings management, such as the discretionary 
current accruals (DCA) that Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, b), Rangan (1998), and DuCharme, 
Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004) use, and the discretionary total accruals (DTA) that Hribar and 
Collins (2002) suggest. Different measurement windows of accruals and disclosure do not 
change the results.   
Managers of firms with unusual income-decreasing accruals have a strong incentive to 
provide extensive disclosure at the time of an equity offering in order to prevent possible 
lawsuits from investors and to make sure that investors do not misinterpret their poor reported 
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performance. Skinner (1994) suggests managers have legal incentives to disclose bad news. 
Skinner (1997) also provides evidence on the relation between earnings disclosure and 
stockholder litigation. After controlling for confounding factors, he finds that voluntary 
disclosures occur more in quarters that result in litigation than in quarters that do not and more 
timely disclosure is related to lower settlement amounts.  
To rule out this alternative explanation (i.e., firms with unusual income-decreasing 
accruals provide extensive disclosure to make sure that investors do not misinterpret their poor 
reported performance) of a negative relation between earnings management and disclosure, we 
conduct the 3SLS regression using only income-increasing accruals, i.e., positive ADTA only. 
The results reported in the right hand side of Table III suggest a strong and negative relation 
between ADTA and DL.  The relation is statistically insignificant when we conduct the same 
tests with samples of income-decreasing discretionary accruals only. Combined together, these 
results provide convincing evidence that firms with extensive disclosures are less likely to 
manipulate earnings. 
Consistent with Skinner’s (1994) finding, we find that performance measured by 
annualized ROA and changes in performance measured by changes in annualized ROA are 
negatively associated with voluntary disclosure. These results support Skinner’s premise that 
firms that are performing poorly disclose more in order to reduce expected legal costs.  Our 
results also suggest that firm size is positively related to disclosure. This supports Skinner’s 
(1994) argument that the dollar values of damages in securities litigation are a positive function 
of firm size. The relation between disclosure and the number of analysts following the firm 
(NUM_ANST) is also positive. The results are consistent with the finding of Lang and 
Lundholm (1996). It seems reasonable to expect that the more analysts following the firm, the 
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higher the level of information disclosure because security analysts frequently ask managers to 
collect information that they then analyze and publish. Our results reveal, however, that 
empirical associations between disclosure and return variables, such as the market adjusted 
return (AR_bf6m), the return-earnings correlation (RE), and return volatility (STD10YR), are 
weak. The empirical associations between disclosure and the ownership variables of INSTI, 
BLOCK, and INSIDER are all weak.  We also find that the ADTA is negatively associated with 
operating cash flow (OCF) and changes in performance (CROA). These results support the 
Dechow’s (1994) finding that discretionary accruals are negatively correlated with operating 
cash flows. The negative relation between the ADTA and CROA supports the finding of 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) that earnings are managed to avoid losses and negative changes 
in earnings. 
 
Long-term, post-issue SEO return performance 
To examine the long-term effect of socially responsible and ethical decisions on post-
issue performance, we examine the long-term return performance for up to five years after a SEO.  
For that task, we first classify our total sample into four groups. In particular, if the average 
percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(+3), 
the DL, is greater than the third quartile value and the ADTA is greater than or equal to the 
median value, then the sample is assigned to group 1. If the DL is greater than the third quartile 
value and the ADTA is less than the median value, then the sample is classified as belonging to 
group 2 (ethical firms choosing high disclosure). If the DL is less than the first quartile value and 
the ADTA is greater than or equal to the median value, then the sample is classified as belonging 
to group 3 (unethical firms choosing low disclosure). If the DL is less than the first quartile value 
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and the ADTA is less than the median value, then the firm is assigned to group 4.  According to 
our convention, groups 1 and 3 are unethical firms and groups 2 and 4 are ethical firms. Groups 1 
and 2 include firms with socially responsible disclosure levels and groups 3 and 4 include firms 
with socially irresponsible disclosure levels. Our major interest of comparison is firms with 
ethical reporting that choose persistent disclosure vs. firms with unethical reporting that choose 
low disclosure. 
We then follow the Fama & French (1993) three-factor model approach and run the 
regression for individual securities in each group. Table 4 presents the post-issue returns up to 
five years after the Q(+2) earnings announcement.  
 
[Insert Table IV about here.] 
 
Buy-and-hold returns are market-adjusted returns compounded daily over the one-year period after 
the Q(+2) earnings announcement. The three-factor model α coefficients are alphas from the 
Fama & French three-factor model estimated over 12- to 60-month periods after the Q(+2) 
earnings announcement. Panel A reports the one-year post-issue returns based upon buy-and-
hold returns and three-factor model α coefficients for up to five years for various groups. Panel 
B reports the results of the difference tests of long-term, post-issue returns across the various 
groups.  
Interestingly, evidence suggests that firms with high disclosure and low earnings 
management (group 2) perform significantly better than firms with low disclosure and high 
earnings management (group 3) over the five-year period. For instance, the means of the monthly 
abnormal returns estimated over 12 and 60 months for group 2, based upon the Fama & French 
three-factor model, are higher (less negative) than those of group 3 by 16.88% and 14.76% per 
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year, respectively.9  In addition, over the five-year period, firms with high disclosure and high 
earnings management (group 1) have consistently higher α coefficients than those of firms with 
low disclosure and high earnings management. For example, the means of monthly 
α coefficients estimated over 12 and 60 months for group 1 are higher than those of group 3 by 
6.58% and 14.09% per year, respectively. These results indicate that firms with extensive 
disclosure substantially reduce their post-issue SEO underperformance over the long run.  Our 
unreported analysis suggests that these results remain qualitatively similar with slightly weaker 
significance when we use different cut-off points, such as medians for both variables of DL and 
ADTA. 
From these results, we maintain that the impact of voluntary disclosure lasts for a 
substantial time period because the information effect alone cannot sustain significant 
differences in returns among groups for up to five years after a SEO. However, there is no 
significant difference between firms with high disclosure and high earnings management (group 
1) and firms with high disclosure and low earnings management (group 2).  It seems that among 
high-disclosure firms, earnings management alone does not change long-term, post-issue 
performance. These results are understandable because investors can see through earnings 
management after the offering when enough information is revealed through persistent and 
frequent, transparency-increasing disclosures. In addition, comparison between groups 3 and 4 
suggests that when disclosure level is relatively low, post-offering SEO underperformance is 
more severe when earnings management is aggressive. Overall, the evidence from the 
                                                           
9 We calculate the post-issue annual return differences between groups 2 and 3 based upon the numbers reported in 
Panel A of Table 4 as follows: [(-0.00572) – (-0.01979)] x 12 = 0.1688 and [(-0.00063) – (-0.01293)] x 12 = 0.1476. 
Similarly, we compute the post-issue annual return differences between groups 1 and 3 as [(-0.01431) – (-0.01979)] 
x 12 = 0.0658 and [(-0.00119) – (-0.01293)] x 12 = 0.1409. 
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comparisons between group 1 and group 3, between group 2 and group 3, and between groups 3 
and 4 are consistent with our monitoring hypothesis. 
However, the difference tests of high- and low-disclosure firms among firms with low 
earnings management (i.e., group 2 and group 4) suggest insignificant results.  While the 
explanations regarding the insignificant difference between groups 2 and 4 are not readily 
apparent, we conjecture that when earnings management is relatively low, the impact of 
disclosure on post-offering performance is not substantial, presumably because the post-issue 
underperformance of firms with conservative earnings management is not severe.  
Disclosure made in different periods might affect equity offering firms’ earnings 
manipulation differently. To check the robustness of our results taking the timing differences into 
account, we classify our total sample into four groups based on average percentile rank of the 
number of press releases per six-month period over the M(-4) through M(0) period (before the 
offering) instead of M(-4) through M(+3) (around the offering).   
 
[Insert Table V about here.] 
 
The results reported in Table V suggest that the results from the comparison between 
group 1 and group 3 based upon M(-4) through M(0) period remain significant over 3, 4, and 5 
years. In addition, the results from the comparison between group 2 and group 3 remain 
significant over 1, 2, 4, and 5 years after a SEO and comparison between groups 3 and 4 shows 
significant difference over 2, 3, 4, and 5 years after a SEO. Although the results from the M(-4) 
through M(0) period seem slightly weaker than the results from the M(-4) through M(+3) period, 
they are still significant up to five years. Insignificant results of the difference tests between group 
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1 and group 2 and between group 2 and group 4 remain the same over the M(-4) through M(0) 
period. 
While it is not completely possible to distinguish the information effect from the 
monitoring effect, the information effect alone cannot last for up to five years after a SEO.  
Fama’s (1970) efficient market hypothesis suggests that stock prices fully reflect all relevant 
information instantaneously, and it is difficult for anyone to consistently outperform the market 
averages. Consequently, we claim that the evidence of long-term, post-issue SEO performance 
supports the monitoring explanation and the view that corporate conduct grounded in social 
responsibility and ethical decisions eventually pays.  
 
Additional tests 
The previous section shows that based upon the Fama & French (1993) three-factor 
model, the long-term underperformance of SEOs is significantly lower for ethical firms choosing 
extensive disclosure than unethical firms choosing low disclosure. To examine the impact of 
disclosure and earnings management on long-term SEO performance further, we perform the 
following additional regressions.    
We run regressions using post-issue returns up to five years after Q(+2) earnings 
announcement as dependent variables and DL, ADTA, and other firm characteristics including 
firm size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM), and leverage (LEV) as the explanatory variables. 
Our results reported in Panel A of Table VI show that the coefficients on ADTA are significant 
and negative over all five estimation periods. While positive over all five estimation periods, the 
coefficients on DL are significant in the regressions estimated over 12-, 24- and 60-month 
periods. The coefficients on SIZE are all significantly positive while the coefficients on BM and 
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LEV are mostly insignificant except that of BM estimated over 12 months. We also run 
regressions using post-issue returns up to five years after Q(+2) earnings announcement as 
dependent variables and various interaction dummy variables representing four groups in Table 
IV and other firm characteristics variables of SIZE, BM, and LEV as the explanatory variables. 
The intercept represents the returns for the firms in the middle two quartiles (second and third 
quartiles) of disclosure distribution, and therefore the coefficients on group dummy variables can 
be understood as the difference between returns for a specific group and returns for this base 
group. The results reported in Panel B suggest that consistent with the results reported in Table 
IV, the coefficient on the group dummy representing low disclosure-high earnings management 
firms (LDL_HEM) is most negative and statistically significant over all estimation windows 
except the first year. The coefficient on high disclosure and low earnings management group 
(HDL_LEM) is positive, but significant only in the first year.  The coefficients on high 
disclosure and high earnings management group (HDL_HEM) and those on low disclosure and 
low earnings management group (LDM_LEM) are insignificant. Combined together, these 
results suggest that the market penalty over the long-term is most substantial for the firms with 
aggressive earnings management and socially irresponsible disclosure (LDL_HEM), supporting 
our monitoring hypothesis (b). 
 
Conclusions 
 In this article, we address complex issues of ethics and disclosure using a sample of 
seasoned equity offering firms. We attempt to examine these complicated matters from the 
viewpoint of three academic areas, including business ethics, accounting, and finance. 
Specifically, we examine whether socially responsible disclosure decisions of seasoned equity 
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offering firms and unethical earnings manipulations are endogenously determined. We also 
examine whether the long-term, equity market values SEO firms’ socially responsible and ethical 
decisions. We maintain that the relations among ethics, disclosure, and long-term financial 
performance can be understood when we view socially responsible issuing firms as those with 
extensive voluntary disclosure and ethical firms as firms with limited earnings management.   
We find that disclosure is endogenously determined and negatively associated with 
earnings management and vice versa. Our findings support the premise that extensive disclosure 
reduces information asymmetry, exposes unethical earnings manipulation, and therefore, reduces 
the incentive to manage earnings in SEO firms. 
While the theory of agency and disclosure has been perhaps one of the most important 
areas in the study of corporate finance and accounting, direct empirical evidence on the issue is 
scarce. In particular, only a few studies examine the effect of disclosure on corporate 
performance. In this study, we provide evidence on this issue. Specifically, we find that socially 
responsible disclosure activities around the announcement of a SEO positively affect long-term, 
post-issue performance. Interestingly, we find that ethical firms disclosing extensively provide 
considerably higher returns than firms managing their earnings but disclosing less, even up to 
five years after a SEO. We interpret this evidence to mean that the information effect alone is not 
sufficient to explain long-term, post-offering performance issues. Instead, we maintain that the 
effect of monitoring on post-issue performance lasts for a long period of time and that the 
financial market values corporate efforts toward social responsibility.  
These findings support the notion that greater disclosure helps reduce information 
asymmetry, enhances the transparency of earnings by increased monitoring, reduces agency 
costs from the separation of ownership and control, and reduces long-term, post-issue SEO 
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underperformance. The direction of this relation is consistent with the common intuition that 
corporate efforts to incorporate social responsibility, such as improving the transparency of the 
information environment through voluntary disclosure, will eventually improve firm 
performance. The results of this study also suggest that the supply of corporate information is 
determined, in part, by SEO firms’ post-issue performance considerations, presumably due to 
their reputation concerns.  
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Appendix A: Calculation of disclosure level (DL) 
 
We first obtain the number of press releases for each six-month period around SEO announcement by 
searching DJI database system. To obtain a measure of disclosure comparable across time periods, we 
convert the number of press releases to average percentile rank. We show an example below. 
 
Observation #1   SEO   
       4/18/1995       
                 
6 month periods M(-24, -18) M(-18, -12) M(-12, -6) M(-6, 0) M(0, +6) M(+6, +12) M(+12, +18) M(+18, +24) 
Calendar year assigned         
for the annual ranking 1993 1994 1994 1995 1995 1996 1996 1997 
Number of PRs 8 6 9 10 9 11 12 11 
         
Observation #2   SEO   
       9/7/1995       
                 
6 month periods M(-24, -18) M(-18, -12) M(-12, -6) M(-6, 0) M(0, +6) M(+6, +12) M(+12, +18) M(+18, +24) 
Calendar year assigned         
for the annual ranking 1993 1994 1994 1995 1995 1996 1996 1997 
Number of PRs 22 21 24 30 28 32 33 33 
         
Observation #3   SEO   
       7/20/1996       
                 
6 month periods M(-24, -18) M(-18, -12) M(-12, -6) M(-6, 0) M(0, +6) M(+6, +12) M(+12, +18) M(+18, +24) 
Calendar year assigned         
for the annual ranking 1994 1995 1995 1996 1996 1997 1997 1998 
Number of PRs 6 6 6 9 8 9 9 8 
         
Observation #4   SEO   
       11/3/1997       
                 
6 month periods M(-24, -18) M(-18, -12) M(-12, -6) M(-6, 0) M(0, +6) M(+6, +12) M(+12, +18) M(+18, +24) 
calendar year assigned         
for the annual ranking 1995 1996 1996 1997 1997 1998 1998 1999 
Number of PRs 13 13 14 17 15 18 18 19 
         
 
  Number of PRs annual rank annual percentile rank* 
     
1996 PRs from Observation #1 M(+6, +12) 11 3 0.2857 
 from Observation #1 M(+12, +18) 12 4 0.4286 
 from Observation #2 M(+6, +12) 32 7 0.8571 
 from Observation #2 M(+12, +18) 33 8 1 
 from Observation #3 M(-6, 0) 9 2 0.1486 
 from Observation #3 M(0, +6) 8 1 0 
 from Observation #4 M(-18, -12) 13 5 0.5714 
 from Observation #4 M(-12, -6) 14 6 0.7143 
     
 Number of samples in 1996: 8   
     
 * (annual rank-1) / (number of samples each year – 1) 
 
This Appendix A is borrowed from Jo and Kim (2007).
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                               TABLE I 
Sample characteristics of seasoned equity offerings 
 
Panel A: Time Distribution 
 
Year Freq % Cum Freq % 
1990 83 5.80 83 5.80 
1991 190 13.28 273 19.08 
1992 173 12.09 446 31.17 
1993 200 13.98 646 45.15 
1994 149 10.41 795 55.56 
1995 189 13.21 984 68.77 
1996 231 16.14 1,215 84.91 
1997 216 15.09 1,431 100.00 
 
 
Panel B: Size characteristics 
 
 Mean STD Median First quartile Third Quartile 
Total assets 987.5879 3,641.0980 146.2965 43.3660 544.4810 
      
Market value of equity 780.3003 2,907.0380 199.8094 81.8935 611.3351 
      
Book value of equity 291.8861 918.6333 62.1460 19.3850 202.5740 
 
 
Panel C: Offer Characteristics 
 
 Mean STD Median First quartile Third Quartile 
Offer amount 81.1986 131.9153 42.7880 19.2000 90.0000 
      
Offer size 0.2607 0.3212 0.1901 0.1125 0.3096 
      
Offer size (in amounts) 0.2972 0.3830 0.2010 0.1158 0.3549 
 
This table summarizes our sample of 1,431 seasoned equity offerings of common stock by US industrial firms over 
the period 1990 through 1997. We terminate our sample in 1997 in order to examine post-offering returns up to five 
years after the offerings, i.e., up to 2002. The total assets, market value of equity and book value of equity are 
measured at the end of the quarter before the offering announcement.  The total assets, market value of equity, book 
value of equity and offer amount are measured in millions of dollars.  Offer size is measured as the number of shares 
offered divided by the number of pre-offering shares outstanding.  Offer size (in amounts) is measured as the offer 
amount divided by the market value of equity. 
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TABLE II 
Bivariate correlations 
 
         DL   ADTA      ROA  
         
   CROA   AR_bf6m  
         
     SIZE         RE   STD10yr  NUM_ANST       OCF  
 
        LEV 
 
 NONB6  
                         
ADTA -0.0853 **                       
ROA -0.0288  -0.0979 **                     
CROA 0.0041  0.0911 ** -0.7647 ***                   
AR_bf6m -0.0259  0.0299  0.1129 *** -0.0761 ***                 
SIZE 0.4711 *** -0.1311 *** 0.1879 *** -0.0865 *** 0.0316                
RE 0.0043  -0.0180  0.1731 *** -0.0740 ** 0.0249  -0.0441              
STD10YR -0.0459  0.0179  -0.0338  -0.0433  0.4533 *** -0.1576 *** 0.0501 *           
NUM_ANST 0.4326 *** -0.1017 *** 0.1369 *** -0.0607 ** -0.0793 *** 0.6775 *** -0.0530 * -0.1613 ***         
OCF 0.0318  -0.3205 *** 0.7710 *** -0.5169 *** 0.0872 *** 0.2606 *** 0.2136 *** -0.0555 * 0.2039 ***       
LEV 0.0224  0.0128  0.0005  0.0123  -0.0485 * -0.0104  0.0227  -0.0111  0.0327  0.0128    
NONB6 -0.1159 *** 0.1189 *** -0.0116  0.0066  -0.0620 ** -0.1830 *** 0.0186  -0.0084  -0.1229 *** -0.0867*** 0.0075   
ABSTACC -0.0769 ** 0.1342 *** -0.5155 *** 0.5246 *** 0.0030  -0.2035 *** -0.0160  0.0565 * -0.1536 *** -0.4155*** 0.0002 0.1369 *** 
 
This table shows pearson correlation coefficients among select variables. ADTA is annualized performance adjusted discretionary total accruals over the period 
Q(–1) through Q(+2) scaled by lagged total assets.  DTA is annualized discretionary total accruals over the period Q(–1) through Q(+2) scaled by lagged total 
assets.  Panel B presents pearson correlation coefficients among variables used in the regression analyses. DL: average percentile rank of the number of press 
releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(+3);  ADTA: annualized performance adjusted discretionary total accruals over the period Q(–1) through 
Q(+2) scaled by lagged total assets; ROA: annualized ROA measured as income before extraordinary items summed over Q(–1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at 
the beginning of Q(-1); CROA: changes in annualized ROA measured as income before extraordinary items summed over Q(+3) to Q(+6) and scaled by assets at 
the beginning of Q(+3) - income before extraordinary items summed over Q(–1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1); AR_bf6m: market-
adjusted returns over one-year period ending 6 months before the offering announcement.  Market-adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the return on the 
value-weighted market index from firm returns; SIZE: log of the market value of equity at Q(-1); RE: annual return/earnings correlation measured over the10 
year period before the offering announcement; STD10YR: standard deviation of market-adjusted returns over 10 years prior to the offering announcement; 
NUM_ANST: the number of analysts’ following; OCF: operating cash flows over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) scaled by the lagged total assets; LEV: debt-
to-equity ratio, the proxy for the closeness to the violation of lending contracts; NONB6: indicator variable, which is set to equal 1 if the firm’s auditor is not one 
of big six accounting firms, and 0 otherwise; ABSTACC: absolute value of total accruals over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) scaled by the lagged total assets. 
 
***, **, * significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE III 
Regression results of simultaneous equation model of disclosure and earnings management 
 
Independent 
variables 
Dependent variable: DL 
Full sample 
 Dependent variable: DL 
With positive ADTA only 
 
Intercept 0.19432  0.14707   0.15482  017255  
 (4.15) *** (4.50) ***  (2.41) ** (3.54) *** 
ADTA -0.37151  -0.37184   -0.40354  -0.29466  
 (-3.37) *** (-4.56) ***  (-2.70) *** (-2.27) ** 
ROA -0.26848  -0.25830   -0.29627  -0.30051  
 (-5.86) *** (-7.22) ***  (-4.54) *** (-5.40) *** 
CROA -0.13849  -0.17715   -0.13259  -0.19665  
 (-2.14) ** (-3.32) ***  (-1.40)  (-2.51) *** 
AR_bf6m -0.00801     0.00171    
 (-0.82)     (0.14)    
SIZE 0.05637  0.06123   0.06693  0.05804  
 (6.00) *** (9.33) ***  (5.15) *** (6.16) *** 
RE 0.00713     0.00170    
 (0.46)     (0.09)    
STD10YR 0.01079     0.02811    
 (0.61)     (1.32)    
INSTI -0.06901     -0.09910    
 (-1.25)     (-1.31)    
BLOCK -0.02403     -0.01194    
 (-0.59)     (-0.23)    
INSIDER -0.00129     0.02894    
 (-0.02)     (0.41)    
NUM_ANST 0.00558  0.00419   0.00415  0.00587  
 (2.84) *** (2.82) ***  (1.56)  (2.70) *** 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
Dependent variable: ADTA  Dependent variable: ADTA  
With positive ADTA only 
Intercept 0.06415  0.08371   0.07588  010283  
 (1.11)  (1.91) *  (1.13)  (2.22) ** 
DL -0.65433  -0.82955   -0.61231  -0.59262  
 (-3.91) *** (-4.83) ***  (-2.39) ** (-3.08) *** 
OCF -0.30236  -0.31391   -0.30061  -0.32084  
 (-6.28) *** (-7.24) ***  (-4.90) *** (-6.51) *** 
CROA -0.12401  -0.18156   -0.1753  -0.20115  
 (-1.90) * (-3.04) ***  (-1.92) * (-2.89) *** 
SIZE 0.05589  0.06315   0.05651  0.04369  
 (4.14) *** (4.67) ***  (2.56) ** (2.73) *** 
LEV -0.00057  0.00014   0.00105  0.00009  
 (-0.60)  (0.41)   (0.37)  (0.28)  
INSTI -0.00924     -0.14705    
 (-1.70) *    (-2.06) **   
BLOCK -0.00193     -0.00809    
 (-0.47)     (-0.16)    
INSIDER 0.00524     0.05990    
 (0.93)     (0.88)    
NONB6 -0.00889  0.00471   0.05551  0.02976  
 (-0.27)  (0.21)   (1.35)  (1.08)  
ABSTACC 0.01511  0.43309   1.60767  2.05000  
 (0.02)  (0.82)   (1.70) * (2.89) *** 
 
Number of observations 
 
459 
  
627 
   
272 
  
356 
 
System Weighted 2R  22.54%  26.43%   27.61%  29.68% 
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This table reports the results of association tests between disclosure and discretionary accruals of SEO 
firms.  The following equations are estimated using three-stage simultaneous equation system:  
    
 1) DL = a + b1 ADTA + b2 ROA + b3 CROA + b4 AR_bf6m + b5 SIZE + b6 RE + b7 STD10YR + b8 INSTI  
                 + b9 BLOCK + b10 INSIDER + b11 NUM_ANST 
 2) ADTA = a + b1 DL + b2 OCF + b3 CROA + b4 SIZE + b5 LEV + b6 INSTI + b7 BLOCK + b8 INSIDER  
                + b9 NONB6 +b10 ABSTACC 
 
where DL: average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-4) 
through M(+3);  ADTA: annualized performance adjusted discretionary total accruals over the period Q(–1) 
through Q(+2) scaled by lagged total assets; ROA: annualized ROA measured as income before 
extraordinary items summed over Q(–1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1); CROA: 
changes in annualized ROA measured as income before extraordinary items summed over Q(+3) to Q(+6) 
and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(+3) - income before extraordinary items summed over Q(–1) to 
Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1); AR_bf6m: market-adjusted returns over one-year 
period ending 6 months before the offering announcement.  Market-adjusted returns are computed by 
subtracting the return on the value-weighted market index from firm returns; SIZE: log of the market value 
of equity at Q(-1); RE: annual return/earnings correlation measured over the10 year period before the 
offering announcement; STD10YR: standard deviation of market-adjusted returns over 10 years prior to the 
offering announcement; INSTI: percentage ownership of institutional investors; BLOCK: percentage 
ownership of blockholders; INSIDER: percentage ownership of insiders; NUM_ANST: the number of 
analysts’ following; OCF: operating cash flows over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) scaled by the lagged 
total assets; LEV: debt-to-equity ratio, the proxy for the closeness to the violation of lending contracts; 
NONB6: indicator variable, which is set to equal 1 if the firm’s auditor is not one of big six accounting 
firms, and 0 otherwise; ABSTACC: absolute value of total accruals over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) 
scaled by the lagged total assets. ***, **, * significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-sided 
significance tests, respectively. t-values are in the parentheses. 
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TABLE IV 
Long term, post-issue return performance and difference tests over the M(-4) through M(+3) period 
 
Panel A: post-issue returns 
 Group 1 (High DL, High EM)  Group 2 (High DL, Low EM)  Group 3 (Low DL, High EM)  Group 4 (Low DL, Low EM) 
 Mean  Median   Mean  Median   Mean  Median   Mean  Median  
1 year Buy-and-hold returns                
 -0.04766  -0.11167 *  -0.06686  -0.10595 ***  -0.17627 *** -0.23568 ***  0.03602  -0.09697  
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 12 months          
 -0.01431 ** -0.00726   -0.00572  -0.00500   -0.01979 *** -0.01275 ***  -0.01242  0.00458  
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 24 months          
 -0.00696  -0.00587 **  -0.00487 ** -0.00348 **  -0.01655 *** -0.00929 ***  -0.00363  0.00502  
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 36 months          
 -0.00444  -0.00261   -0.00627 ** -0.00476 **  -0.01524 *** -0.00881 ***  -0.00220  0.00359  
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 48 months          
 -0.00286  -0.00129   -0.00212  -0.00256   -0.01405 *** -0.00536 ***  -0.00367  -0.00081  
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 60 months          
 -0.00119  -0.00204   -0.00063  -0.00112   -0.01293 *** -0.00437 ***  -0.00387  -0.00011  
 
Panel B: P-values from the One-tailed T-tests between groups  
           Group 1 vs. 3  Group 2 vs. 3  Group 1 vs. 2  Group 3 vs. 4 
              
1 year Buy-and-hold returns       0.0596*  0.0815*  0.4128  0.0278** 
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 12 months 0.2732  0.0426**  0.2788  0.2102 
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 24 months 0.0879*  0.0260**  0.3451  0.0634* 
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 36 months 0.0426**  0.0583*  0.3474  0.0522* 
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 48 months 0.0332**  0.0191**  0.4316  0.0974* 
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 60 months 0.0267**  0.0149**  0.4467  0.1236 
 
This table presents the post-issue returns up to five years after Q(+2) earnings announcement. Buy-and-hold returns are market-adjusted returns compounded daily 
over the one-year period after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. Three-factor model α coefficients are alphas from the Fama-French three-factor model estimated 
over 12 to 60 month periods after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. The following regression is estimated for each firm: (Rit – Rft) = α + b1 (Rmt – Rft) + b2 
SMBt + b3 HMLt + eit where Rit is monthly return of SEO firm in 12 to 60 month periods after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. ADTA: performance-adjusted 
annualized discretionary total accruals over the period Q(–1) through Q(+2) scaled by lagged total assets.  Following Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), we create 
a control sample based on ROA in the quarter before SEO announcement and industry (two-digit SIC code) for each offering.  The ADTA for a SEO firm is the 
discretionary total accruals for that firm minus the discretionary total accruals of the matched non-SEO firm. If average percentile rank of the number of press 
releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(+3) is greater than the third quartile value and ADTA is greater than or equal to the median value, then the 
sample is assigned into group 1. If average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(+3) is greater than the third 
quartile value and ADTA is less than the median value, then the sample is classified into group 2. If average percentile rank of the number of press releases per 
six-month period over M(-4) through M(+3) is less than the first quartile value and ADTA is greater than or equal to the median value, then the sample is 
classified into group 3. If average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(+3) is less than the first quartile value 
and ADTA is less than the median value, then the sample is classified into group 4. ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE V 
Robustness check: Long term, post-issue return performance and difference tests over the M(-4) through M(0) period 
 
Panel A: post-issue returns 
 Group 1 (High DL, High EM)  Group 2 (High DL, Low EM)  Group 3 (Low DL, High EM)  Group 4 (Low DL, Low EM) 
 Mean  Median   Mean  Median   Mean  Median   Mean  Median  
1 year Buy-and-hold returns                
 -0.04393  -0.09948   -0.03056  -0.07490   -0.16558 *** -0.24334 ***  0.04500  -0.05102  
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 12 months          
 -0.01235  -0.00349   -0.00416  -0.00460   -0.01400 *** -0.00730 ***  -0.00948  0.00387  
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 24 months          
 -0.00452  -0.00318   -0.00378  -0.00361   -0.01152 *** -0.00696 ***  -0.00095  0.00502  
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 36 months          
 -0.00238  -0.00135   -0.00510 * -0.00422   -0.01019 *** -0.00604 **  -0.00230  0.00165  
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 48 months          
 -0.02431  -0.00156   -0.00127  -0.00344   -0.00932 ** -0.00372 **  -0.00071  -0.00081  
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 60 months          
 -0.00115  -0.00020   -0.00010  -0.00106   -0.00849 ** -0.00351 *  0.00056  0.00305  
 
Panel B: P-values from the One-tailed T-tests between groups  
           Group 1 vs. 3  Group 2 vs. 3  Group 1 vs. 2  Group 3 vs. 4 
              
1 year Buy-and-hold returns       0.0846*  0.0631*  0.4450  0.0223** 
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 12 months 0.4261  0.0650*  0.1764  0.2853 
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 24 months 0.1438  0.0652*  0.4491  0.0586* 
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 36 months 0.0765*  0.1364  0.2937  0.0998* 
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 48 months 0.0910*  0.0413**  0.3984  0.0829* 
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 60 months 0.0715*  0.0287**  0.4014  0.0722* 
 
This table presents the post-issue returns up to five years after Q(+2) earnings announcement. Buy-and-hold returns are market-adjusted returns compounded daily 
over the one-year period after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. Three-factor model α coefficients are alphas from the Fama-French three-factor model estimated 
over 12 to 60 month periods after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. The following regression is estimated for each firm: (Rit – Rft) = α + b1 (Rmt – Rft) + b2 
SMBt + b3 HMLt + eit where Rit is monthly return of SEO firm in 12 to 60 month periods after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. ADTA: performance-adjusted 
annualized discretionary total accruals over the period Q(–1) through Q(+2) scaled by lagged total assets.  Following Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), we create 
a control sample based on ROA in the quarter before SEO announcement and industry (two-digit SIC code) for each offering.  The ADTA for a SEO firm is the 
discretionary total accruals for that firm minus the discretionary total accruals of the matched non-SEO firm. If average percentile rank of the number of press 
releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(0) is greater than the third quartile value and ADTA is greater than or equal to the median value, then the 
sample is assigned into group 1. If average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(0) is greater than the third 
quartile value and ADTA is less than the median value, then the sample is classified into group 2. If average percentile rank of the number of press releases per 
six-month period over M(-4) through M(0) is less than the first quartile value and ADTA is greater than or equal to the median value, then the sample is classified 
into group 3. If average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-4) through M(0) is less than the first quartile value and ADTA 
is less than the median value, then the sample is classified into group 4. ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE VI 
Regression analyses: Long term, post-issue return performance on disclosure and earnings management 
 
Panel A: Regression with continuous variables 
 
  
Dependent variables  Independent variables Adjusted 
  Intercept DL ADTA SIZE BM LEV   2R  
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model         
 estimated over 12 months -0.0475 0.0135 -0.0197 0.0040 0.0106 0.0001   0.0253 
  (-5.46)*** (1.71)* (-2.25)** (2.41)** (2.21)** (0.57)    
 estimated over 24 months -0.0300 0.0126 -0.0167 0.0024 0.0022 0.0001   0.0180 
  (-4.55)*** (2.02)** (-2.37)** (2.00)** (0.58) (0.64)    
 estimated over 36 months -0.0211 0.0047 -0.0205 0.0031 -0.0021 0.0001   0.0186 
  (-2.96)** (0.72) (-2.79)*** (2.30)** (-0.53) (1.25)    
 estimated over 48 months -0.0244 0.0080 -0.0247 0.0044 -0.0042 0.0001   0.0408 
  (-3.63)*** (1.31) (-3.58)*** (3.45)*** (-1.11) (0.51)    
 estimated over 60 months -0.0240 0.0096 -0.0214 0.0025 -0.0001 0.0001   0.0298 
  (-4.05)*** (1.69)* (-3.32)*** (2.35)** (-0.03) (0.45)    
           
Panel B: Regression with group dummies 
 
         
Dependent variables  Independent variables Adjusted 
  Intercept HDL_HEM HDL_LEM LDL_HEM LDL_LEM SIZE BM LEV 2R  
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model         
 estimated over 12 months -0.0408 0.0006 0.0115 -0.0073 -0.0007 0.0036 0.0106 0.0001 0.0144 
  (-5.17)*** (0.10) (2.01)** (-1.28) (-0.10) (2.10)** (2.10)** (0.34)  
 estimated over 24 months -0.0253 0.0034 0.0068 -0.0092 -0.0003 0.0025 0.0027 0.0001 0.0092 
  (-4.08)*** (0.67) (1.47) (-1.96)** (-0.05) (1.92)* (0.64) (0.35)  
 estimated over 36 months -0.0198 0.0056 0.0017 -0.0113 0.0047 0.0030 -0.0010 0.0001 0.0121 
  (-2.99)*** (1.06) (0.35) (-2.30)** (0.84) (2.06)** (-0.23) (0.81)  
 estimated over 48 months -0.0204 0.0037 0.0030 -0.0123 -0.0002 0.0042 -0.0031 0.0001 0.0204 
  (-3.21)*** (0.73) (0.65) (-2.61)*** (-0.04) (3.01)*** (-0.75) (0.12)  
 estimated over 60 months -0.0254 0.0047 0.0032 -0.0084 -0.0011 0.0030 0.0018 0.0001 0.0211 
  (-4.06)*** (0.96) (0.70) (-1.86)* (-0.21) (2.76)*** (0.46) (0.11)  
 
This table presents the regression of post-issue returns up to five years after Q(+2) earnings announcement on disclosure and earnings management. Three-factor 
model α coefficients are alphas from the Fama-French three-factor model estimated over 12 to 60 month periods after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. The 
following regression is estimated for each firm: (Rit – Rft) = α + b1 (Rmt – Rft) + b2 SMBt + b3 HMLt + eit where Rit is monthly return of SEO firm in 12 to 60 
month periods after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. DL: average percentile rank of the number of press releases per six-month period over M(-4) through 
M(+3);  ADTA: annualized performance adjusted discretionary total accruals over the period Q(–1) through Q(+2) scaled by lagged total assets; HDL_HEM: one 
if DL is greater than the third quartile value and ADTA is greater than or equal to the median value, zero otherwise; SIZE: log of the market value of equity at 
Q(-1); BM: book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at Q(-1); LEV: debt-to-equity ratio; HDL_HEM: one if DL is greater than the third 
quartile value and ADTA is less than the median value, zero otherwise; LDL_HEM: one if DL is less than the first quartile value and ADTA is greater than or 
equal to the median value, zero otherwise; LDL_LEM: one if DL is less than the first quartile value and ADTA is less than the median value, zero otherwise. In 
Panel B, the intercept captures the returns for firms with two middle quartile (second and third quartiles) values of DLs. ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. t-values are in the parentheses. 
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Figure 1. Time line of seasoned equity offerings.  
 
This figure shows our timing convention.  Q(.) represents the quarters around a SEO.  The quarter of the last earnings announcement before the offering 
announcement is labeled Q(–1).  Q(0) is the quarter of the first earnings announcement after the offering announcement.  All other quarters are similarly indexed 
relative to the offering announcement.  M(.) is the six-month period in which disclosure frequencies are determined.   M(-1) is the last six-month period prior to 
the SEO announcement, and M(0) is the first six-month period after the SEO announcement.  All other six-month periods are similarly indexed relative to the 
offering announcement.  Eann stands for earnings announcement. We measure post-issue returns by compounding daily market-adjusted returns over the one-
year period after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. The figure also illustrates important event dates and periods around SEO.  1933 Securities Act prohibits any 
“offer to sell” prior to the filing of the registration statement before the file of the offer.  It also prohibits any sales prior to the effective date.  The period between 
the date of file and the effective date is “Waiting Period”.  The average Waiting Period in Rangan (1998) is 35 days.  In our sample the average Waiting Period is 
49 days and the median is 35 days.  Lock-up agreements between issuing firms and their underwriters prevent insiders at issuing firms from selling their holdings 
until 90 to 180 days after the offering date. 
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Figure 2. Relationship among disclosure, earnings management, and post-issue returns. 
  
This figure illustrates bivariate relationship among disclosure, earnings management, and the post-issue performance 
of SEO firms.  AR1Y is market adjusted returns compounded daily over the one-year period after the Q(+2) earnings 
announcement.  DL, our measure of disclosure frequency, is average percentile rank of the number of press releases 
per six-month period over M(-4) through M(+3).  ADTA, our measure of earnings management, are annualized 
performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals over the period Q(-1) through Q(+2) scaled by lagged assets.  For a 
better presentation, ADTA is converted to the standardized percentile rank.  We first rank ADTA and convert it to 
percentiles by taking (rank-1)/(number of samples-1).  We then standardize the percentile by taking (percentile rank –
0.5) / 0.5, so that the final measure falls in the range between –1 and 1. 
  
 
